The most serious threat to peace signed this week comes from the Bosnian Serbs, who not only publicly denounced the agreement, but privately refused to open either the map or the military annexes to the long and complex agreement. It was only a few minutes before the announcement of the peace agreement that the Bosnian Serbs were stunned in the delegation when they saw that they had lost the suburbs of Sarajevo and that they were commanding heights they defended during the siege. After the initials in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995, the full and formal agreement was signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris and was followed by Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, French President Jacques Chirac, US President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister John Major, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. The main objective of the agreement is to promote peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to promote regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia (Article V, Appendix 1-B), i.e. from a regional perspective.  The agreement reached on 21 November 1995 by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia ended the war between the former Yugoslav republics and outlined a peace agreement. They withdrew for another dispute with Dirty Dick, the chief negotiator of the United States, Richard Holbrooke, to set aside flags and chairs and restore some euro-honour debris. The 21-day negotiations in Dayton may have reached a Bosnian peace agreement, but they have opened a wide gap between the United States and the Europeans in the contact group. The speeches, from a podium in front of 23 flags, placed in French alphabetical series, were strictly limited to six minutes each.
Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia, said: “My government signs this agreement without any enthusiasm, as someone who takes a bitter but useful potion.” This was one of the first cases in which the Court of Justice had to deal with the legal nature of the Constitution. In making a remark of the nature of the obiter dictum concerning Annex IV (Constitution) and the rest of the peace agreement, the Court effectively “created the ground for the legal unity” of the entire peace agreement, which further implied that all annexes were in hierarchical equality. In subsequent decisions, the Court confirmed that it was using other annexes of the peace agreement as a basis for direct analysis, and not only in the systematic interpretation of Schedule IV. However, since the Court rejected the applicant, it did not address the issues relating to the legality of the procedure in which the new Constitution (Annex IV) came to power and replaced the old Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court used the same reasoning to dismiss the similar appeal in a later case.  Prior to the agreement, Bosnian Serbs controlled about 46% of Bosnia and Herzegovina (23,687 km2), Bosniaks 28% (14,505 km2) and Bosnian Croats 25% (12,937 km2). The immediate objective of the agreement was to freeze the military confrontation and prevent its resumption. It was therefore defined as a “construction of necessity.”  On October 13, 1997, the Croatian right-wing party in 1861 and the right-wing Party Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1861 asked the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to overturn several decisions and uphold a decision of the Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, more importantly, to verify the constitutionality of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. , the agreement violates the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, more importantly, has undermined the integrity of the state and could lead to the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Share
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